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We provide insights into determinants of the rating level of 371 issuers which defaulted in the 
years 1999 to 2003, and into the leader-follower relationship between Moody’s and S&P. The 
evidence for the rating level suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all 
observed periods before the default event. Furthermore, we observe two-way Granger causal-
ity, which signifies information flow between the two rating agencies. Since lagged rating 
changes influence the magnitude of the agencies’ own rating changes it would appear that the 
two rating agencies apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade through several mild down-
grades. Further, our analysis of rating changes shows that issuers with headquarters in the US 
are less sharply downgraded than non-US issuers. For rating changes by Moody’s we also 
find that larger issuers seem to be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers.  
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1  Introduction 
Credit ratings are becoming more and more important now that Basel II has come into force. 
Thanks to the widened application of credit ratings, the performance of rating systems will be 
more crucial than ever before. Since the number of internal ratings profoundly exceeds the 
number of external ratings, commercial banks’ internal rating systems deserve particular at-
tention. More than ever, the analysis of defaulted debtors will be an integral part of the meas-
urement of the performance of internal rating systems. Banking regulation authorities will in 
future conduct in-depth analysis of the rating changes over time of debtors that subsequently 
default, given that these mostly non-investment grade debtors affect the regulatory equity of 
banks to a large degree. Since regulators have access to the rating and default data of internal 
rating systems, they are able to conduct leader-follower analysis for the comparison of differ-
ent internal rating systems. If external rating agencies’ rating levels for different periods be-
fore default are available - and we deliver them in this study - they might act as a proxy meas-
ure of how early internal ratings should be adjusted, i.e. how long before their debtors default. 
Since internal ratings are mostly point-in-time ratings, their adjustment process should be 
faster than that of external ratings, and external ratings should define the lower bound only. 
Besides regulation authorities, a group of cooperating banks should also be interested in per-
forming this kind of analysis in order to detect weaker rating systems within the group, as-
suming that they are able to pool their internal rating and default data.  
Unfortunately, performing leader-follower analysis with banks’ internal data is difficult, be-
cause banks are normally not interested in sharing their data. Therefore, the rating and default 
data provided by external rating agencies are a possible alternative. An analysis of leader-
follower relationships between external rating agencies sheds more light on the increasingly 
important market for external credit ratings, which should be more transparent than it is nowa-
days. Besides benchmark analysis of the quality of default predictions by credit rating agen-2 
cies (e.g., Güttler, forthcoming), a leader-follower analysis is a further possible means of 
benchmarking their performance. This makes sense, since the rating leader reveals more in-
formation than rating followers. Publishing leader-follower results, ideally on a continuous 
basis, could allow investors and regulators to learn more about the performance of these risk 
assessments. This might raise the level of competition among the existing rating agencies, 
thereby increasing the effort exerted by the rating agencies to analyze issuers carefully.  
What would be the consequences, i.e., the economically important outcome, of a leader-
follower analysis? In the case of banks’ internal rating systems, rating leaders will define the 
best practice whereas rating followers might be forced by regulation authorities to increase 
their efforts to install a state-of-the-art rating system. In the case of rating agencies, rating 
leaders should be privileged in every process of recognition by the regulation authorities, 
should such a process become necessary. Rating leaders should also be able to strengthen 
their market position in comparison to rating followers.  
Since we have no access to banks’ internal data we use a dataset of 371 defaulted issuers with 
rating and default information to analyze the adjustments of external credit ratings by the two 
rating agencies Moody’s and S&P. As far as we know, our study is the first analysis of de-
faulted debtors with ratings by more than one rater.  
Hence, we address two main research questions:  
1)  What are the determinants of the rating level assigned to debtors that will subsequently 
default?  
2)  Does one rating agency anticipate upcoming defaults earlier than the other?  
The evidence suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all observed periods 
before the default event. Besides, larger issuers and fallen angels have higher ratings and issu-
ers belonging to the telecommunications sector have lower ratings. Furthermore, we observe 
two-way Granger causality, which signifies information flow between the two rating agencies. 
Since lagged rating changes influence the magnitude of the agencies’ own rating changes it 3 
would appear that the two rating agencies apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade 
through several mild downgrades. Further, our analysis of rating changes by Moody’s and 
S&P shows that issuers with headquarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US 
issuers. For rating changes by Moody’s we also find that larger issuers seem to be down-
graded less severely than smaller issuers. These results should be of interest for banks, for 
banking regulation authorities, for the regulation authorities that oversee credit rating agen-
cies, for the rating agencies themselves and for investors. 
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the relevant literature. 
This is followed by the formulation of our hypotheses. We then describe the dataset and pre-
sent the empirical results. The final section contains a brief summary of our findings. 
2  Overview of the Literature 
Credit ratings have long been of interest to academic researchers. For our purpose, the litera-
ture can be divided into three relevant areas:  
1)  comparisons of different credit rating agencies in respect of the quality and/or timeli-
ness of their credit ratings; 
2)  comparisons of the speed of adjustment of external ratings with market based meas-
ures of credit risk and that of banks’ internal ratings; 
3)  potential reasons for the staleness of external credit ratings. 
In the first area, Krämer and Güttler (2003) and Güttler (forthcoming) find that rating agen-
cies provide profound information about the default risk of issuers in the long term. The au-
thors compare credit ratings by Moody’s and S&P on the basis of several validation measures 
and both come to the conclusion that Moody’s seems to outperform S&P slightly. Johnson 
(2003) examines rating changes around the investment grade boundary. He finds that the 4 
credit rating agency Egan-Jones
* leads S&P in downgrading issuers from BBB- (see table 3 
for S&P’s rating scale) to non-investment grade ratings. 
Regarding the adjustment speed, Hand et al. (1992) and Carey and Hrycay (2001) find that 
credit rating agencies react relatively slowly to increasing default risk in the short term. They 
provide evidence that credit ratings by external agencies are relatively stable compared to 
alternative rating systems such as the internal rating systems employed by banks. Norden and 
Weber (2004) r eveal that roughly 60% of the negative abnormal returns of credit default 
swaps due to rating downgrades take place before the rating changes have been announced. 
The slow reaction of external ratings to new information is also shown by Delianedis and 
Geske (1999). They use risk neutral probabilities of default to predict upcoming rating 
changes. Hence, they are able to detect rating migrations months in advance. This appears to 
be a clear sign that the market reacts much more quickly than credit rating agencies.  
Third, the slow adjustment of external credit ratings to the changing default risk is mainly due 
to the “through-the-cycle” approach of the credit rating agencies, i.e. their policy of changing 
a credit rating only when it is unlikely to be reversed shortly afterwards (Cantor, 2001). 
Therefore, no credit rating change takes place if the financial situation of a company is only 
worsening because of a (temporary) deterioration of the general economic situation, e.g. in a 
recession. Löffler (2004) shows that one of the underlying reasons for the through-the-cycle 
approach is the desire to minimize avoidable transaction costs for institutional investors. In a 
more critical view of the rating industry, Amato and Furfine (2004) argue that since monitor-
ing is costly, rating agencies may not have sufficient resources to examine all rated firms on a 
continuous basis. This could lead to staleness in ratings, meaning that the link between the 
rating of any given firm at any point in time and the factors that influence its determination 
might not truly reflect the decision-making behavior of the rating agency.  
                                                 
*  Egan-Jones Ratings is a small, young credit rating agency, which has issued ratings since 1995. In contrast to S&P, 
Moody’s, Fitch Ratings, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) and A.M. Best it is not recognized as a Nationally Recog-
nized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 5 
Our research expands the existing literature insofar as we analyze leader-follower relation-
ships directly through Granger analysis instead of relying on (indirect) event study a p-
proaches, as Norden and Weber (2004) do. Since rating leadership is an indicator of the fore-
casting quality of a rater, we enlarge upon the comparison of the performance of external rat-
ing agencies offered by Krämer and Güttler (2003) and Güttler (forthcoming). Besides, our 
concentration on issuers that subsequently defaulted allows us to focus on the most important 
part of the investment universe, since this fraction is the most important one for the regulatory 
capital of banks and for the reputation of credit rating agencies.  
3  Hypotheses 
Since we are interested in the determinants of the rating level
† of issuers that subsequently 
default, we posit the following four hypotheses: 
H1 (anticipation problem hypothesis): Companies which defaulted because of a chapter 11 
filing have a better
‡ credit rating.  
We assume that defaults after chapter 11 filings are more difficult for credit rating agencies to 
detect than default reasons such as “missed interest payment” and “suspension of payments”. 
This expectation is based on anecdotal evidence from public auditing firms, which gave a 
clean bill of health to 42.1% of the public companies that subsequently defaulted because of a 
chapter 11 filing between January 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002 (Weiss, 2002). This ratio seems 
rather high, but the lack of econometrically robust results limits the scope for interpretation of 
this evidence. One would expect a missed interest payment or a suspension of payments to be 
due to a liquidity shortage. As liquidity is one of the most important quantitative parameters 
                                                 
† We also use the four hypotheses for the analysis of rating changes. Rather than the absolute levels of the ratings, it is the 
magnitude of the changes in the ratings that is of interest.  
‡ In the following we use the term “better rating” to refer to a lower risk assessment by rating agencies. 6 
in credit ratings (e.g., Standard & Poor’s, 2003) a low level of liquidity is incorporated into 
the credit ratings. In contrast, a filing for chapter 11 is often the course of action chosen to 
protect a company before a problematic liquidity situation develops, and might therefore be 
more difficult to anticipate.
§   
H2 (home bias hypothesis): US issuers have a better credit rating before default.  
We expect that, on average, US issuers are rated higher, or are downgraded to a lesser extent, 
than non-US issuers. Beattie and Searle (1992) report that rating agencies judge issuers from 
their own country less strictly. Shin and Moore (2003) find that ratings assigned by Moody’s 
and S&P to Japanese firms are systematically lower than those assigned by the Japanese rat-
ing agencies R&I and JCR. In addition, Nickell et al. (2000) observe that higher rated Japa-
nese firms are more likely to be downgraded by credit rating agencies with headquarters in the 
US, and Japanese firms with low ratings are less likely than US firms to be upgraded by those 
agencies. All these results might be explained by the conservatism of US credit rating agen-
cies in less known markets. However, Ammer and Packer (2000) find no evidence for differ-
ent default rates between US and foreign firms for the period 1983 to 1998 after controlling 
for time and rating effects. In our opinion, this result of Ammer and Packer (2000) might be 
due to the low number of defaults among foreign firms. Since they analyze 20 foreign non-
financial firms, in contrast to 440 US non-financial firms, the rejection of the null hypothesis 
of inequality of US and foreign default rates is quite unlikely. 
H3 (incentive problem hypothesis): Larger companies have a better credit rating before de-
fault.  
We use the outstanding value of debt at the time of default as a proxy for company size. Since 
credit rating agencies are partly paid in basis points of the debt volume there might be an in-
                                                 
§ This differentiation is somewhat biased since chapter 11 filings (or comparable options) are not installed in all national 
insolvency regimes. 7 
centive to rate bigger companies higher in order to avoid losing the client because of a pessi-
mistic rating. Given the high degree to which the terms and conditions of borrowing are de-
pendent on external credit ratings, downgrades are very costly for companies. It is well known 
that credit rating agencies rely heavily on their reputation for not allowing such considerations 
to influence their assessments (Covitz and Harrison, 2003). However, given the low level of 
competitive pressure in the credit rating market, which is dominated by only three credit rat-
ing agencies (Moody’s, S&P and to some extent Fitch), there might be some incentive for 
moral hazard (White, 2002). 
H4 (information flow hypothesis): Changes in the credit rating by one credit rating agency 
increase the probability of a credit rating change in the same direction by the other credit 
rating agency. 
The fourth hypothesis covers the leader-follower relationship between the rating behavior of 
Moody’s and that of S&P. Producing credit ratings is very expensive given the vast impor-
tance of soft rating criteria,
** which must be collected through intensive contact with the man-
agement. Therefore, i t would seem rational for credit rating agencies to treat rating changes 
by another important rating agency as a trigger prompting them to review their own ratings. 
Hence following the rating changes of competitors is less costly than doing one’s own re-
search. For example, Norden and Weber (2004) show that Fitch appears to follow the rating 
actions of Moody’s and S&P to some extent. Since our research is the first known study in 
this area we have no clear indication of whether Moody’s or S&P leads the other rating 
agency. Nonetheless, several empirical studies (Cantor and Packer, 1997; Ederington and 
Yawitz, 1987; Güttler, forthcoming; and Perry, 1985) of split ratings of issuers rated by 
Moody’s and S&P show that Moody’s assigns lower ratings on average. The ratios of split 
ratings, where Moody’s assigns the lower rating, are between 54.44% and 62.25% in these 
                                                 
** Soft rating criteria are, for example, the quality of the management or the product policy of the issuer in comparison to its 
competitors.  8 
studies.
†† Therefore, we should expect that Moody’s has the leading position, because more 
conservative ratings should be an advantage for a sample of  issuers that subsequently de-
faulted.  
4  Dataset 
Since we want to examine changes in the rating of companies that subsequently defaulted, a 
database of defaulted firms and their credit rating history before the default event is required. 
For this purpose, we use the default data contained in annual default reports by Moody’s and 
S&P on publicly traded companies for the years 1999 to 2003. We define the default event as 
the earliest date reported by the two agencies, on a daily basis. In 19 (5.12%) cases, the de-
fault reports contained only monthly default data. Therefore, we convert these monthly data 
into daily data using the first day of the month as a conservative proxy for the default date. 
Beginning in 1990, the rating history of long-term, senior unsecured ratings, i.e. issuer ratings, 
and the history of so-called Watchlist entries was obtained from Bloomberg. The main advan-
tage of this data source is that it allows the company names to be matched automatically be-
tween the datasets of Moody’s and S&P.  
We undertake the following sample adjustments: The raw data includes 532 default an-
nouncements by Moody’s and 642 by S&P. For 404 companies, default announcements by 
both Moody’s and S&P are observed. Excluding firms without a long-term, senior unsecured 
rating by both agencies before the defined default date narrows our sample down to 371 firms. 
This is done to avoid biased results attributable to differences between the samples of the two 
credit rating agencies, and to conduct a leader-follower analysis. For these 371 issuers the 
dataset contains 1,345 issuer ratings by Moody’s and 1,789 by S&P.  
                                                 
†† The reasons for these results are not clear. They could be due to the fact that Moody’s applies a so-called expected loss 
rating approach, because not only the probability of default but also the loss given default is taken into account in the rating 
process, whereas S&P relies solely on the probability of default.  9 
The annual default reports of the two rating agencies provide additional information about the 
reason for default, the country in which the firm’s headquarters are located, the outstanding 
debt amount at the time of default and the line of business of the defaulted firms. An overview 
of these descriptive statistics is given in table 1. As debt amount, we use the reported values in 
billions of US dollars. If there are discrepancies between the two agencies we calculate the 
mean between Moody’s and S&P if they report the same default date; if they do not report the 
same date we use the debt amount as of the earlier default date. 
Missed interest payments are the main reason for default, followed by chapter 11 filings. As 
in other international studies, US-based firms dominate our sample, accounting for almost 
80% of the total number of firms. This is due to the US origin of these two rating agencies, 
which did not begin to expand their activities to other regions until the 1980s. The relatively 
large number of defaults in Argentina can partly be explained by the sovereign default in 
2001. Aside from widely known companies like Enron and Worldcom, defaults by smaller 
issuers dominate our dataset: in over 55.5% of all default cases, the outstanding amount of 
debt at the time of default is less than USD 250 million. The telecommunications sector leads 
by a long way, reflecting the bursting of the asset bubble and the unwillingness of investors to 
support these (mostly) highly leveraged companies any longer. There are 30 so-called fallen 
angels in our sample. These are companies which formerly had an investment grade rating 
(Baa3 / BBB- or better) but were downgraded to non-investment grade (Ba1 / BB+ or worse) 
during our observation period, which begins in 1990.
‡‡  
The five-year period for which we compile default data, 1999 to 2003, includes years in 
which the economy was healthy and others in which economic conditions were unfavorable. 
As we can see from table 2, whereas only 34 multiple defaults are observed in 1999, this vari-
able peaks in 2001 at 117 and declines to 46 in 2003. The mean (median) amount of out-
                                                 
‡‡ Obviously, we are not able to identify as fallen angels those issuers that have a rating history that goes back further than 
1990. Fallen angel status should therefore be interpreted as being applicable in the medium term only. 10 
standing debt peaks one year later in 2002, with an average amount of USD 1.05 (0.30) bil-
lion.  
To compare the timeliness of the rating adjustment by Moody’s and S&P it is necessary to 
construct a master scale of credit ratings because the two rating agencies do not apply the 
same rating scale, even though their rating scales look quite similar at first sight. Furthermore, 
Moody’s assesses the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default (LGD), whereas 
S&P only evaluates the PD (Estrella, 2000). Our mapping approach is shown in table 3. We 
utilize a master scale with 21 notches by assigning numerical values to ratings (Aaa/AAA = 1, 
Aa1/AA+ = 2, ..., C/D = 21). This approach is common in the relevant literature: Cantor and 
Packer (1997) and Perry (1985) use 17 rating classes, and Ederington and Yawitz (1987) use 
18. Since, in contrast to these studies, our dataset is dominated by low ratings, we break the 
low segment down further, making a total of 21 classes. Because we want to differentiate the 
rating classes as widely as possible in the lower segment, we do not use the average historical 
default rates of the two agencies instead of the numerical rating classes, since in the yearly 
publications of the rating agencies these default rates are lumped together into one class for all 
ratings below B3/B-. Therefore, utilizing default rates would have yielded only 17 rating 
classes. 
Besides rating changes, Bloomberg also delivers Watchlist entries. As part of the rating moni-
toring process, an issuer might be placed on a formal rating review, which is called the 
Watchlist. These entries signal to the market participants that a rating change in the near fu-
ture is highly probable, but that the rating analysts need more time to assess the magnitude of 
the forthcoming rating change. Watchlist announcements are often made after M&A activities 
or corporate restructuring plans have been published. As one example among several, Hand et 
al. (1992) provide evidence of significantly abnormal stock returns after announcements of 
additions to the S&P Watchlist. Furthermore, default rates for issuers placed on the Watchlist 
of Moody’s are different from issuers that do not appear on this list (Keenan et al., 1998). 11 
Hamilton and Cantor (2004) find that the accuracy of default predictions is significantly better 
after the inclusion of Watchlist information.
§§ Besides, Hamilton and Cantor incorporate 
Watchlist information into credit ratings by adjusting the rating by two notches upwards in the 
case of a positive Watchlist entry and two notches downwards in the case of a negative 
Watchlist entry.  Thus, the authors anticipate forthcoming rating events, as in most cases 
Watchlist additions are followed by rating changes in the same direction. In this study, we 
make use of Watchlist information by adding 1 to the numerical rating for a negative Watch-
list entry and by subtracting 1 from the numerical rating for a positive entry. 
5  Empirical Results 
We first analyze the adjustment of the numerical credit ratings before the default events by 
using the most recent rating for the following time periods: over 1,440 days, between 1,440 
and 1,081 days, between 1,080 and 721 days, between 720 and 541 days, between 540 and 
361 days, between 360 and 181 days, between 180 and 91 days and between 90 and 31 days 
before our defined default event.  
Table 4 shows the results for the rating level before default. As a tendency, the closer the de-
fault date, the lower the mean ratings of both rating agencies are. On average, Moody’s as-
signs lower ratings than S&P for all eight periods. This result is in line with research into split 
ratings (Cantor and Packer, 1997, Ederington and Yawitz, 1987, Güttler, forthcoming, and 
Perry, 1985). Besides the mean rating, the 10%-quantile and the median of ratings assigned by 
Moody’s are always lower than or equal to those assigned by S&P. Another relevant measure 
is the frequency of investment grade ratings. Enron is a well-known instance of a late down-
grade of a borrower to a non-investment grade rating before default. Both Moody’s and S&P 
downgraded this debtor to non-investment grade only a couple of days before it actually de-
                                                 
§§ Hamilton and Cantor (2004) also include Outlook information. Since we do not have Outlook information we concentrate 
on Watchlist additions. 12 
faulted. Since, on the one hand, events like this damage the reputation of credit rating agen-
cies and, on the other hand, are very costly for investors, we believe that the ratio of invest-
ment grade rated debtors in a certain time frame prior to the default event is an important 
quantity with which to measure the timeliness of credit ratings. The frequency of investment 
grade ratings and the 10%-quantile of ratings by Moody’s are equal to or higher than those by 
S&P for the first four periods, i.e. > 1,440 to 720-541 days before default. This changes in the 
last four periods before the default event, where Moody’s assigns lower ratings according to 
the 10%-quantile and the frequency of investment grade ratings is also lower.   
Table 5 gives the results of our univariate analysis, which is done to detect significant deter-
minants for the credit rating level using nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. The antici-
pation problem hypothesis is supported for the last period, i.e. 90 to 31 days before the default 
event, for the credit ratings by S&P on the 10% significance level. For the other periods, the 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. For Moody’s we find no evidence for this 
hypothesis at all.  
Except for the last period of ratings assigned by S&P, in which US issuers are assigned sig-
nificantly higher ratings, there is no evidence to confirm the home bias hypothesis. Clearer 
confirmation is found for the incentive problem hypothesis, since for 3 (6) time periods the 
ratings assigned by Moody’s (S&P) for companies with an above-median outstanding debt 
amount (as our proxy for company size) are significantly better. We also analyze whether 
telecommunications firms have a lower rating than firms belonging to other sectors. We do 
indeed observe this pattern for 3 (6) periods for ratings assigned by Moody’s (S&P). In addi-
tion, we find that fallen angels are assigned better ratings by both agencies in all periods.   
To additionally check the characteristics of the defaulted issuers we perform a multivariate 
analysis of determinants  k X  for the credit rating  R of debtor i for the 8 different time spans 
t before default for Moody’s and S&P: 13 
  t , i
k




  (1) 
where  t , i , X1  equals 1 if the company  i in period  t defaulted because of a chapter 11 filing, 
and zero if not;  t , i , X2  equals 1 if the company  i in period  t has its headquarters in the US, 
and zero if not;  t , i , X3  is equivalent to the outstanding debt amount at the time of default of the 
corresponding company  i in period  t (measured as the natural log of the debt amount in bil-
lions of US dollars);  t , i , X4  equals 1 if company  i in period  t operates in the telecommunica-
tions sector, and zero if not;  t , i , X5  equals 1 if company  i in period  t is a fallen angel, zero if 
not; and  t , i e  is the random disturbance of issuer i in period t. In Eq. (1) t signifies the eight 
periods before default. Therefore, we conduct eight regressions, i.e. one for each period, for 
the rating level of Moody’s (panel I) and eight additional regressions for S&P (panel II) as a 
dependent variable.  
Table 6 gives the results of the multivariate analysis. As in the preceding univariate analysis 
we find no evidence to support the anticipation hypothesis. In contrast to the univariate analy-
sis, we find (slight) confirmation of the home bias hypothesis for three periods for Moody’s. 
As in the univariate analysis there is evidence in favor of the incentive problem hypothesis: 
we find a significant negative correlation between rating and size in six of the eight periods 
for Moody’s and S&P. In other words, bigger firms are assigned better ratings. For the two 
additional variables we find confirmatory results for the telecommunications sector and the 
fallen angel coefficient. Obviously, the number of issuers in the regressions varies over the 
eight periods, and it is not clear whether this variation influences the results. We test this by 
analyzing a fixed sample with 230 (324) issuers rated by Moody’s (S&P) through the whole 
period from at least 721 days before default without interruption until the default event.
*** 
                                                 
*** Of course this could also be done with fixed samples from two periods even further away from the default point, but we 
chose the sixth period in order to be able to work with larger sample sizes. 14 
Table 7 shows the results for this robustness check. These results are almost the same as in 
table 6. For the telecommunications dummy, the results are less strong for Moody’s in two 
periods only.     
Obviously, our analysis lacks additional control variables. Results that are more robust should 
be obtainable by using additional balance sheet data. For example, significant results for the 
regression coefficient of the proxy for size could also be due to other factors, e.g., the sounder 
capital structures of bigger firms. We do not include these variables in our analysis for three 
reasons:  
1)  difficulties in comparing balance sheet data produced according to different account-
ing standards, bearing in mind that we include credit ratings and default data for issu-
ers based in 25 different countries; 
2)  to avoid a further reduction of the dataset due to missing accounting data; 
3)  to avoid the exclusion of non-comparable business sectors such as Banking & Finan-
cials or Utilities. 
Summarizing our results for the determinants of the rating level before default using univari-
ate and multivariate analysis, we find that, except for one period in the univariate analysis, 
there is no support for the anticipation hypothesis. Even if a default following a chapter 11 
filing might be more difficult to anticipate, it seems that the two credit rating agencies are not 
biased in cases where chapter 11 is the reason for default. For the home bias hypothesis we 
find only slender evidence in the Moody’s results in three periods in the multivariate analysis 
and in the univariate analysis for the last period of issuers rated by S&P. However, we argue 
that overall there is no clear support for the home bias hypothesis. In contrast to Beattie and 
Searle (1992), Nickell et al. (2000), and Shin and Moore (2003) but in concurrence with Am-
mer and Packer (2000), we find that the US credit rating agencies appear not to favor US is-
suers. Since we do not have the information sets of the rating agencies, we must obviously be 
careful in interpreting these quantities. It is also conceivable that the rating agencies have 15 
more negative information about US issuers than the credit ratings would indicate, but do not 
take it fully into account. However, we do find evidence for the incentive problem hypothesis 
insofar as larger companies have better ratings than smaller ones. Besides, it seems that com-
panies belonging to the telecommunications sector have lower ratings than the rest of the is-
suers. We find the strongest effect among the fallen angels: formerly investment grade-rated 
issuers have far better ratings than issuers that have always been rated as non-investment 
grade throughout our observation period, i.e., from 1990 to 2003. 
Next, we apply Granger causality analysis to test the information flow hypothesis, i.e. to test 
whether one credit rating agency causes the other to adjust its risk assessments, and to test the 
market anticipation hypothesis.
††† In contrast to the preceding analysis of the rating level of 
issuers that subsequently defaulted, we now concentrate on rating changes. Table 8 shows the 
distribution of the rating changes per issuer for Moody’s and S&P. Since the first rating in our 
dataset serves as an initial rating, we need at least one additional rating change to calculate 
actual rating changes. Therefore, the size of our dataset declines from 371 in the preceding 
analysis to 316 issuers with multiple rating changes for Moody’s and S&P. For these 316 is-
suers with multiple rating changes there are 877 rating changes by Moody’s and 1,178 rating 
changes by S&P. Hence, for S&P we find more rating changes per issuer on average. The 
maximum number of rating changes per issuer is 13 for Moody’s and 15 for S&P.  
Table 8 also shows the difficulties of our dataset. We have a panel structure with a cross sec-
tion of 316 issuers and a time series for a section of the issuers. However, the panel is very 
unbalanced. For 96 issuers we have only one rating change available, i.e. no time series data. 
Since we analyze multiple rating changes only, our dataset would shrink considerably if we 
were to use a panel approach. Nevertheless, intuition and the results presented in table 4 give 
sufficient reason to assume the existence of a strong time trend. Rating downgrades are 
sharper the closer the default event comes. Therefore, even though we prefer not to use a 
                                                 
††† Among others, Ederington and Goh (1998) apply a somewhat similar Granger causality analysis between Moody’s rating 
changes and revisions of stock analysts’ forecasts. 16 
panel approach due to data restrictions, we have to control for the time trend by using period 
dummies for the distance to default.
‡‡‡ 
We define two basic sets of Granger causality  regression models (Granger, 1969), the first 
with Moody’s as potential rating follower and S&P as potential rating leader (regression 
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where 
M
t i R , D  indicates a rating change by Moody’s for debtor i at time t, and 
S
j t i R - D ,  specifies 
the change of the rating for debtor i by S&P for three predefined periods  j t - : 
-  j = 1: 1 to 90 days before the rating change of debtor i at time t 
-  j  = 2: 91 to 180 days before the rating change of debtor i at time t 
-  j = 3: 181 to 360 days before the rating change of debtor i at time t 
The variable 
M
j t i R - D ,  incorporates the lagged rating changes of Moody’s for debtor i for the 
same three periods  j t - . 
The regression with S&P as potential rating follower and Moody’s as potential rating leader is 



















-   (3) 
To control for the distance to default the rating changes are attributed to 8 periods before the 
default event by applying 7 dummy variables in regression model II. The last period before 
default, i.e. in this analysis up to 90 days before default, serves as the reference. Hence we 
                                                 
‡‡‡ Nevertheless, we have checked with a reduced panel dataset whether fixed effects are observable in the cross section and 
over the periods. We find significant period fixed effects only. By using period dummies in the pooled OLS analysis, we are 
able to control for the period effect without losing any data.  17 
define regression model II with Moody’s as potential rating follower and S&P as potential 
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where Iw,i,t are seven indicator variables with the value 1, if the rating change by Moody’s 
took place more than 1,440 days (w = 7), between 1,440 and 1,081 days (w = 6), between 
1,080 and 721 days (w = 5), between 720 and 541 days (w = 4), between 540 and 361 days (w 
= 3), between 360 and 181 days (w = 2), between 180 and 91 days (w = 1) before default and 
zero otherwise.  
The respective regression model II with S&P as potential rating follower and Moody’s as po-
tential rating leader is defined through the term (panel II of table 9):  
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Furthermore, we also include our five known additional variables – reason for default, loca-
tion of headquarters, debt amount, sector and fallen angel – for regression model III in panel I 
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for S&P as potential rating follower and Moody’s as potential rating leader (see panel II in 
table 9).  
For the analysis of the information flow hypothesis we test for the two regression models the 
null hypotheses 
1
j b  = 0 and 
3
j b  = 0. Rejecting the null hypothesis would mean for  0
1 „ j b  
( 0
3 „ j b ) that S&P granger cause Moody’s (Moody’s granger cause S&P) for the time period 
j  before the rating change in  t, i.e. that information flows from S&P to Moody’s (Moody’s 
to S&P). Unidirectional Granger causality results if we find only  0
1 „ j b  or  0
3 „ j b  on com-
mon significance levels. Two-way causality results for significant results for both  0
1 „ j b  and 
0
3 „ j b .  
For the coefficients of the lagged rating changes of the potential rating follower we test the 
null hypotheses  0
2 = j b  and  0
4 = j b . For the period dummies in the regression models II and 
III we test the null hypotheses ?1 = 0, …, ?7 = 0. For the five additional coefficients in regres-
sion model III we test the null hypotheses ?1 = 0,…, ?5 = 0. 
Results for the Granger analysis are given in table 9. We find clear evidence for the informa-
tion flow hypothesis, i.e. that rating changes by one credit rating agency increase the probabil-
ity of a rating change by the other credit rating agency in the same direction, since we observe 
two-way Granger causality. Since  0
1
1 > b  and  0
1
2 > b  on the 1% significance level in all three 
regression models, S&P granger cause Moody’s in the time periods 1-90 and 91-181 days 
before default. Because we also observe  0
3
1 > b  on the 1% significance level and  0
3
2 > b  on 
the 1% significance level in the first two regression models and  0
3
2 > b  on the 5% signifi-
cance level in the third regression model, this holds for Moody’s as the rating follower, too. 
These results are stable even after adding the period dummies in regression models II and III. 
We find no evidence to suggest that Moody’s has a leading position because of its more con-
servative ratings, as one might have expected.  19 
Adding the period dummies into the regression models (II and III) increases the adjusted R
2 
sharply. For Moody’s as rating follower it jumps from 16.74 to 25.56% and for S&P as rating 
follower it more than doubles from 12.55 to 27.54%. Except for the period 91 – 180 days be-
fore default for Moody’s, the respective coefficient is always significantly less than zero on 
the 1% significance level. Since the period less than 91 days before default serves as our ref-
erence, rating changes – which are mostly downgrades – in the periods further away from the 
default event are less severe. Given the high explanatory power of the period dummies, the 
results of regression model I do not seem to be robust.  
We find greater differences for the lagged coefficients of the respective rating follower’s own 
rating changes. For Moody’s as rating follower,  0 ß
2
1 <  in all three regression models. This 
effect is stronger in regression model II (and III) after adding the period dummies. Rating 
changes of Moody’s in the other two periods, 91 – 180 and 181 – 360, do not seem to influ-
ence the magnitude of the analyzed rating changes. Whereas for S&P as a rating follower in 
regression model I  0 ß
4
j = , the influence of S&P’s own rating changes alter sharply after add-
ing the period dummies in regression models II and III: then  0 ß
4
1 <  on the 1% significance 
level and  0 ß
4
2 <  on the 5% significance level. How can these results for the agencies’ own 
lagged rating changes be interpreted? Since the coefficients for the last period (last two peri-
ods) is negative for Moody’s (S&P), the rating changes – which are mainly downgrades in our 
sample – are less severe when the agency has changed its own rating in the last period (last 
two periods) for Moody’s (S&P).
§§§ These results signify that the two rating agencies might 
apply a policy of taking a severe downgrade through several mild downgrades. The rationale 
for this policy might be to avoid a pronounced deterioration of the agency’s relationship with 
                                                 
§§§ Our results add further evidence to that of the existing studies of serial correlation of rating changes: Altman and Kao 
(1992) detect positive serial autocorrelation in ratings of S&P when the initial rating change was a downgrade; Lando and 
Skødeberg (2002) find positive serial correlations for downgrades in a sample of debtors rated by S&P; Christensen et al. 
(2004) provide this kind of evidence also for a sample of issuers rated by Moody’s. 20 
the rated company. This effect is somewhat stronger for S&P, which might be mainly due to 
the higher numbers of rating changes by this agency.  
Regarding the other explanatory variables for rating changes, our analysis supports the home 
bias hypothesis for Moody’s on the 10% significance level and for S&P on the 1% signifi-
cance level. Issuers with headquarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US 
issuers. For S&P this result strengthens the results of the univariate and multivariate analysis 
for the last period before default (see tables 5 and 6).  For rating changes by Moody’s we also 
find support for the incentive problem hypothesis on the 5% significance level. Hence, larger 
issuers seem to be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers. Unexpected results are 
found for changes in the rating of issuers which defaulted because of a chapter 11 filing. In 
these cases, the downgrades by Moody’s are more pronounced than those of the other issuers. 
We find no significant results regarding the sector or the rating status (fallen angel) for either 
of the rating agencies. 
6   Summary 
Using a dataset consisting of 371 issuers that defaulted in the time period 1999 to 2003, with 
1,345 long-term, unsecured issuer ratings assigned by Moody’s and 1,789 by S&P, this study 
has provided additional insights into determinants of the rating level of these issuers and into 
the leader-follower relationship between Moody’s and S&P. The evidence for the rating level 
suggests that Moody’s assigns lower ratings than S&P for all observed periods before the de-
fault event, which is in line with research into split ratings. Besides, larger issuers and fallen 
angels have higher ratings and issuers belonging to the telecommunications sector have lower 
ratings. Furthermore, we observe two-way Granger causality, which signifies information 
flow between the two rating agencies. Since lagged rating changes influence the magnitude of 
an agency’s own rating changes, it would appear that the two rating agencies apply a policy of 21 
taking a severe downgrade through several mild downgrades. Further, our analysis of rating 
changes supports the home bias hypothesis for Moody’s and S&P. Hence, issuers with head-
quarters in the US are less sharply downgraded than non-US issuers. For rating changes by 
Moody’s we also find support for the incentive problem hypothesis, i.e. larger issuers seem to 
be downgraded less severely than smaller issuers. 22 
Table 1: Characteristics of 371 defaulted firms with multiple ratings by Moody’s and S&P 
371 defaults occurred in the years 1999 to 2003 involving issuers rated by Moody’s and S&P at the time of default. The reasons for default 
are based on information reported by Moody’s. We define the date of the default event as the earliest date reported by either of the two 
agencies. As the reported debt amount, we use the reported values in millions of US dollars. If Moody’s and S&P do not report an identical 
default date and/or if there are discrepancies in the reported debt amount, we calculate the mean outstanding debt amount between Moody’s 
and S&P if they report the same default date, or, if they do not report the same date, we use the debt amount as of the earlier default date. An 
issuer is defined as a “fallen angel” if it had an investment grade rating at some time during the observation period 1990 to 2003 but was 
subsequently downgraded to non-investment grade before the end of 2003. According to table 3 this means a downgrade to a rating worse 
than 10. 
 
    Number of observations  Frequency 
I. Reason for default     
  Missed interest payment  203  0.5472 
  Chapter 11  90  0.2426 
  Distressed exchange  30  0.0809 
  Bankruptcy  12  0.0323 
  Grace period default  10  0.0270 
  Suspension of payments  9  0.0243 
  Missed principal and interest payments  8  0.0216 
  Missed principal payment  6  0.0162 
  Others  3  0.0081 
II. Headquarters     
  USA  291  0.7844 
  UK  16  0.0431 
  Canada  16  0.0431 
  Argentina  11  0.0296 
  Mexico  9  0.0243 
  Greece  4  0.0108 
  Netherlands  3  0.0081 
  Others  21  0.0566 
III. Debt amount (USD million)     
  0-100  69  0.1860 
  100-250  137  0.3693 
  250-500  63  0.1698 
  500-1,000  53  0.1429 
  1,000-2,500  31  0.0836 
  2,500-5,000  12  0.0323 
  5,000-10,000  5  0.0135 
  >10,000  1  0.0027 
IV. Sector     
  Telecommunications  62  0.1671 
  Transportation & Shipping  26  0.0701 
  Miscellaneous  23  0.0620 
  Metals & Mining  22  0.0593 
  Construction, Building, & Real Estate  19  0.0512 
  Industrial  17  0.0458 
  Printing, Publishing, & Broadcasting  17  0.0458 
  Retail  15  0.0404 
  Chemicals, Plastics, & Rubber  14  0.0377 
  Electronics  14  0.0377 
  Beverage, Food, & Tobacco  13  0.0350 
  Consumer Products  13  0.0350 
  Healthcare, Education, & Childcare  12  0.0323 
  Automobile  11  0.0296 
  Banking & Financial  11  0.0296 
  Hotels, Casinos, & Gaming  11  0.0296 
  Technology  11  0.0296 
  Oil & Gas  10  0.0270 
   Others  48  0.1294 
V. Rating history     
  Non-Investment grade  341  0.9191 
  Fallen angel  30  0.0809 23 
Table 2: Distribution of defaults and the amount of outstanding debt over time 
This table shows the distribution of 371 defaults which occurred in the years 1999 to 2003 involving issuers rated by Moody’s and S&P. We 
define the date of the default event as the earliest date reported by either of the two agencies. As the reported debt amount, we use the re-
ported values in millions of US dollars. If Moody’s and S&P do not report an identical default date and/or if there are discrepancies in the 
reported debt amount we calculate the mean outstanding debt amount between Moody’s and S&P if they report the same default date, or, if 
they do not report the same date, we use the debt amount as of the earlier default date. 
 
  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Number of defaults  34  83  117  91  46 
Median outstanding debt  159.75  158.50  225.00  300.00  277.50 
Mean outstanding debt  280.24  314.51  687.29  1054.66  479.19 
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Table 3: Mapping of the rating systems of Moody’s and S&P 
This table shows the mapping of the rating classes of Moody’s and S&P to a numerical rating scale. Numerical ratings of 10 and better 
signify investment grade. We incorporate positive (negative) Watchlist additions by increasing (decreasing) the rating by 1 notch, e.g. an 
issuer with a rating of BBB with a positive Watchlist entry gets a mapped rating of 8 instead of the numerical rating of 9 that it would have 
received without the positive Watchlist entry. 
 
Moody’s  S&P  Numerical rating 
Aaa   AAA   1 
Aa1   AA+   2 
Aa2   AA   3 
Aa3   AA-   4 
A1  A+   5 
A2   A   6 
A3   A-   7 
Baa1   BBB+   8 
Baa2   BBB   9 
Baa3   BBB-   10 
Ba1  BB+   11 
Ba2  BB   12 
Ba3  BB-   13 
B1   B+   14 
B2   B   15 
B3   B-   16 
Caa1   CCC+   17 
Caa2   CCC   18 
Caa3   CCC-   19 
Ca   CC   20 
C  D   21 
 25 
Table 4: Rating adjustments before default 
For the analysis of rating adjustments before default, we arrange the rating history of all defaulted issuers according to eight time periods 
before the defined default date, e.g. the rightmost column “90-31” gives the quantities for the period 90 to 31 days before default. We use the 
mapped, numerical ratings of table 3 from 1 (Aaa/AAA) to 21 (C/D) with adjustments for Watchlist additions. The frequency of investment 
grade rated issuers corresponds to the number of issuers with a rating of 10 and better in the respective time period divided by the total 
number of observations in the respective time period. 
 
  Ratings, days to default 
  >1,440  1,440-1,081  1,080-721  720-541  540-361  360-181  180-91  90-31 
Panel I: Moody's                 
Mean  13.4891  13.9348  14.7913  15.0696  15.4204  16.1758  16.9528  17.6530 
10%-quantile  18  17  18  18  18  19  20  20 
Median  14  15  15  15  16  16  17  18 
90%-quantile  9  9  11  11.2  13  14  15  15 
Observations  92  138  230  273  314  347  360  366 
Frequency of  
investment grade  0.2609  0.1812  0.0957  0.0842  0.0701  0.0461  0.0306  0.0164 
Panel II: S&P 
Mean  13.1084  13.2984  13.7006  13.9655  14.2964  15.0652  15.9838  16.9946 
10%-quantile  15  16  16  16  16  17  19  20 
Median  14  14  14  14  14  15  16  17 
90%-quantile  9  10  11  12  12  13  13  14 
Observations  166  248  324  348  361  368  371  371 
Frequency of  
investment grade  0.1566  0.1169  0.0864  0.0690  0.0609  0.0516  0.0404  0.0216 26 
Table 5: Univariate comparative statics of determinants of the rating level 
For the analysis of five determinants of the rating level we use the mapped, numerical ratings of table 3 from 1 (Aaa/AAA) to 21 (C/D) with adjustment for Watchlist additions. An issuer is defined as a “fallen angel” if it 
had an investment grade rating at some time during the observation period 1990 to 2003 but was subsequently downgraded to non-investment grade before the end of 2003. The table shows results of Wilcoxon rank-sum 
tests for two subsamples, and for all determinants. Results are given for all eight time periods before the defined default date, e.g. the rightmost column “90-31” gives the quantities for the period 90 to 31 days before de-
fault. Two-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
      Average rating, days to default 
    >1,440  1,440-1,081  1,080-721  720-541  540-361  360-181  180-91  90-31 
Panel I: Moody's                           
Default reason  Chapter 11  13.2222  13.6053  14.6964  14.9851  15.3514  15.9136  16.7108  17.5476 
  Non-Chapter 11  13.6000  14.0600  14.8218  15.1534  15.5578  16.3133  17.0530  17.6844 
  Difference  -0.3778  -0.4547  -0.1254  -0.1683  -0.2064  -0.3997  -0.3422  -0.1368 
Headquarters  US  13.5753  14.0288  14.9006  15.1787  15.5228  16.2390  16.9502  17.5749 
  Non-US  13.1579  13.6471  14.4746  14.6522  15.1250  16.1429  17.0152  17.9726 
  Difference  0.4174  0.3818  0.4260  0.5266  0.3978  0.0961  -0.0650  -0.3977 
Debt amount  Larger than median  12.1957  13.1739  14.0435  14.3015  14.7452  15.7110  16.7000  17.6612 
  Lower than median  14.7826  14.6957  15.5391  15.7766  16.1034  16.7376  17.2155  17.6448 
  Difference  -2.5870***  -1.5217**  -1.4957***  -1.4751***  -1.3582***  -1.0266*  -0.5155  0.0164 
Sector  Telecommunications  15.3333  15.1111  15.0500  15.3137  15.5172  16.3607  17.1967  18.3387 
  Non-telecommunications  13.2125  13.7583  14.7368  14.9721  15.4186  16.1502  16.8636  17.4933 
  Difference  2.1208**  1.3528**  0.3132  0.3417  0.0986  0.2105  0.3331  0.8454*** 
Rating  Fallen angel  10.1538  10.1429  10.8966  10.9310  11.2069  12.2000  14.1000  16.0333 
  Non-investment grade  14.8030  14.9000  15.3532  15.5615  15.8491  16.5521  17.2121  17.7976 
  Difference  -4.6492***  -4.7571***  -4.4567***  -4.6304***  -4.6422***  -4.3521***  -3.1121***  -1.7643*** 
Observations     92  138  230  273  314  347  360  366 
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      Average rating, days to default 
    >1,440  1,440-1,081  1,080-721  720-541  540-361  360-181  180-91  90-31 
Panel II: S&P                   
Default reason  Chapter 11  12.7556  13.0678  13.5676  13.8701  14.1852  14.9759  15.6071  16.5595 
  Non-Chapter 11  13.2397  13.2517  13.7400  13.9926  14.3286  15.0912  16.0941  17.1220 
  Difference  -0.4841  -0.1840  -0.1724  -0.1225  -0.1434  -0.1153  -0.4869  -0.5624* 
Headquarters  US  13.2132  13.3781  13.7500  14.0108  14.3028  15.0517  15.9038  16.8316 
  Non-US  12.6333  13.6757  13.6429  14.1064  14.3750  15.1268  16.2338  17.5875 
  Difference  0.5799  -0.2976  0.1071  -0.0956  -0.0722  -0.0750  -0.3300  -0.7559*** 
Debt amount  Larger than median  12.3780  12.7903  13.1728  13.4310  13.7624  14.6033  15.7568  17.1135 
  Lower than median  13.8214  13.7179  14.2284  14.5000  14.8333  15.5272  16.2097  16.8763 
  Difference  -1.4434***  -0.9276**  -1.0556***  -1.0690***  -1.0709***  -0.9239***  -0.4529  0.2372 
Sector  Telecommunications  14.2727  13.2703  14.2245  14.4561  14.7000  15.3387  16.5161  17.9677 
  Non-telecommunications  12.9306  13.3515  13.5425  13.8689  14.2292  14.9900  15.8770  16.7994 
  Difference  1.3422***  -0.0812  0.6820***  0.5872***  0.4708**  0.3487  0.6391**  1.1684*** 
Rating  Fallen angel  9.5200  9.3704  10.0000  10.4286  10.7500  11.5517  13.1333  15.7333 
  Non-investment grade  13.7447  13.7783  14.0507  14.2750  14.5946  15.3658  16.2346  17.1056 
  Difference  -4.2247***  -4.4079***  -4.0507***  -3.8464***  -3.8446***  -3.8141***  -3.1013***  -1.3722*** 
Observations     166  248  324  348  361  368  371  371 28 
Table 6: Regression results of determinants of the rating level 
The table reports the results of eight regressions for each rating agency. Panel I (II) shows results for the rating level of Moody’s (S&P) as 
dependent variable. The dependent variables are the rating levels Ri for the eight periods before the default event. As ratings we use the 
mapped, numerical ratings of table 3 from 1 (Aaa/AAA) to 21 (C/D) with adjustment for Watchlist additions. Independent variables are a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the company defaults because of chapter 11, a second dummy that takes the value 1 if the company has its 
headquarters in the US, the size of the issuer (substituted by the natural log of the debt amount at the time of default), a third dummy that 
takes the value 1 if the company is mainly engaged in the telecommunications sector, and a fourth dummy that takes the value 1 if the com-
pany is classified as a fallen angel. An issuer is defined as a “fallen angel” if it had an investment grade rating at some time during the obser-
vation period 1990 to 2003 but was subsequently downgraded to non-investment grade before the end of 2003. We apply Heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors (White 1980). Two-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% respec-
tively. 
 
  Rating, days to default 
  >1,440  1,440-1,081  1,080-721  740-541  540-361  360-181  180-91  90-31 
Panel I: Moody's                 
Intercept  16.0986***  16.0135***  17.0781***  17.5107***  17.6504***  17.8713***  18.4136***  18.8263*** 
Chapter 11  -0.0859  -0.1125  0.1750  0.1508  0.1468  -0.1321  -0.1093  0.1087 
US  0.6190  0.7379  0.6110*  0.5832**  0.4603*  0.3398  0.0525  -0.2235 
Size  -0.3844*  -0.3534*  -0.4409***  -0.4789***  -0.4244***  -0.3072**  -0.2418  -0.1924 
Telecommunications  2.9247***  2.1168***  1.0968***  1.0312***  0.7015**  0.6246*  0.5602  0.9924*** 
Fallen angel  -4.0844***  -4.1996***  -3.7808***  -3.8767***  -3.9757***  -3.8448***  -2.7355***  -1.5078** 
Observations  92  138  230  273  314  347  360  366 
Adjusted R
2  0.4384  0.4324  0.3573  0.3661  0.3318  0.2486  0.1241  0.0589 
Panel II: S&P                 
Intercept  14.4540***  14.9872***  15.6811***  15.7647***  16.3614***  17.2581***  17.9678***  18.3902*** 
Chapter 11  -0.2072  -0.0068  0.0896  0.1314  0.1225  0.1442  -0.1753  -0.2595 
US  0.4417  0.4453  0.3366  0.2682  0.0770  -0.0551  -0.2099  -0.4434 
Size  -0.2262  -0.3345**  -0.3886***  -0.3538***  -0.3721***  -0.3703***  -0.3100**  -0.2003 
Telecommunications  1.7387***  1.7557***  1.2869***  1.1276***  0.9706***  0.7580**  0.9163**  1.2521*** 
Fallen angel  -3.854***  -3.8655***  -3.4681***  -3.3036***  -3.2901***  -3.2868***  -2.6378***  -1.0838 
Observations  166  248  324  348  361  368  371  371 
Adjusted R
2  0.4035  0.4327  0.3426  0.3083  0.2789  0.2341  0.1354  0.0559 
 
 29 
Table 7: Regression results of determinants of the rating level for a fixed sample 
The table reports the results of six regressions for each rating agency for a fixed sample for each rating agency. We use the 230 (324) issuers 
of the sixth period before default for all regressions to avoid the influence of the changing sample composition. Panel I (II) shows results for 
the rating level of Moody’s (S&P) as dependent variable. The dependent variables are the rating levels Ri for the six periods before the 
default event. As ratings we use the mapped, numerical ratings of table 3 from 1 (Aaa/AAA) to 21 (C/D) with adjustment for Watchlist 
additions. Independent variables are a dummy that takes the value 1 if the company defaults because of chapter 11, a second dummy that 
takes the value 1 if the company has its headquarters in the US, the size of the issuer (substituted by the natural log of the debt amount at the 
time of default), a third dummy that takes the value 1 if the company is mainly engaged in the telecommunications sector, and a fourth 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the company is classified as an fallen angel. An issuer is defined as a “fallen angel” if it had an investment 
grade rating at some time during the observation period 1990 to 2003 but was subsequently downgraded to non-investment grade before the 
end of 2003. We apply Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 1980). Two-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, and * 
representing 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
   Rating, days to default 
  1,080-721  740-541  540-361  360-181  180-91  90-31 
Panel I: Moody's             
Intercept  17.0781***  17.1867***  17.3945***  17.8659***  18.6063***  19.1281*** 
Chapter 11  0.1750  0.2771  0.3339  0.0011  0.0242  0.3829 
US  0.6110*  0.5768*  0.5586*  0.5640  0.1740  -0.1184 
Size  -0.4409***  -0.4200**  -0.3970**  -0.3226*  -0.2757  -0.2523 
Telecommunications  1.0968***  0.8301**  0.6303  0.7114  0.6952  1.2071** 
Fallen angel  -3.7808***  -3.966***  -4.0309***  -4.0615***  -2.8990***  -1.7326*** 
Observations  230  230  230  230  230  230 
Adjusted R
2  0.3573  0.3634  0.3498  0.2901  0.1538  0.0864 
Panel II: S&P             
Intercept  15.6811***  15.7972***  16.3822***  17.2863***  18.0674***  18.4932*** 
Chapter 11  0.0896  0.1181  0.0742  0.0586  -0.1762  -0.1935 
US  0.3366  0.3170  0.1395  0.0314  -0.3567  -0.4849 
Size  -0.3886***  -0.3693***  -0.3832***  -0.3822***  -0.2994*  -0.2205 
Telecommunications  1.2869***  1.0473***  0.8415***  0.7218*  0.7944*  1.2437** 
Fallen angel  -3.4681***  -3.2426***  -3.2379***  -3.1926***  -2.5801***  -0.7922 
Observations  324  324  324  324  324  324 
Adjusted R
2  0.3426  0.3090  0.2809  0.2294  0.1234  0.0434 30 
Table 8: Distribution of the number of rating changes per issuer 
This table shows the distribution of the number of rating changes per issuer. For 316 issuers with multiple rating changes there are 877 rating 
changes by Moody’s and 1,178 rating changes by S&P.   
 
   Number of observations  Frequency 
  Moody’s  S&P  Moody’s  S&P 
1  96  41  30.38%  12.97% 
2  89  73  28.16%  23.10% 
3  51  67  16.14%  21.20% 
4  26  43  8.23%  13.61% 
5  24  41  7.59%  12.97% 
6  12  19  3.80%  6.01% 
7  5  9  1.58%  2.85% 
8  8  6  2.53%  1.90% 
9  1  4  0.32%  1.27% 
> 9  4  13  1.27%  4.11% 
all  316  316  100.00%  100.00% 
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Table 9: Regression results of the Granger analysis 
This table shows results of the Granger analysis applying OLS. The dependent variables are rating changes ?Ri,t by Moody’s in panel I and 
rating changes by S&P in panel II. We use the mapped, numerical ratings of table 3 from 1 (Aaa/AAA) to 21 (C/D) with adjustment for 
Watchlist additions. For 316 issuers we analyze 877 rating changes by Moody’s (panel I) and 1,178 rating changes by S&P (panel II). The 
independent variables of regression model I are lagged rating changes by Moody’s and S&P for three time periods (1-90, 91-180, and 181-
360 days) before the respective rating change. In regression models II and III the rating changes are attributed to eight periods before the 
default event to control for the distance to default by applying seven dummy variables. The last period before default, i.e. in this analysis up 
to 90 days before default, serves as the reference. Further independent variables of regression model III are a dummy that takes the value 1 if 
the company defaults because of chapter 11, a second dummy that takes the value 1 if the company has its headquarters in the US, the size of 
the issuer (substituted by the natural log of the debt amount at the time of default), a third dummy that takes the value 1 if the company is 
mainly engaged in the telecommunications sector, and a fourth dummy that takes the value 1 if the company is classified as a fallen angel. 
An issuer is defined as a “fallen angel” if it had an investment grade rating at some time during the observation period 1990 to 2003 but was 
subsequently downgraded to non-investment grade before the end of 2003. We apply Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (White 
1980). Two-sided significance levels are given as ***, **, and * representing 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
   Regression I  Regression II  Regression III 
  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Panel I: Moody’s rating change as 
dependent variable   
Intercept  0.9462***  0.0622  1.5946***  0.1189  1.9541***  0.2013 
? Rating by Moody’s 1-90 days before  -0.0971*  0.0584  -0.1756***  0.0598  -0.1232**  0.0626 
? Rating by Moody’s 91-180 days before  0.0999  0.0740  0.0167  0.0690  0.0534  0.0689 
? Rating by Moody’s 181-360 days 
before  -0.0487  0.0715  -0.0258  0.0697  -0.0352  0.0692 
? Rating by S&P 1-90 days before  0.4107***  0.0387  0.3076***  0.0416  0.2841***  0.0409 
? Rating by S&P 91-180 days before  0.2760***  0.0683  0.1719***  0.0625  0.1433**  0.0605 
? Rating by S&P 181-360 days before  0.0923  0.0642  0.0332  0.0582  0.0056  0.0570 
91 - 180 days to default      -0.0591  0.1286  -0.0951  0.1295 
181 - 360 days to default      -0.3230***  0.1243  -0.3702***  0.1251 
361 - 540 days to default      -0.7264***  0.1710  -0.8084***  0.1718 
541 - 720 days to default      -0.9585***  0.1961  -1.0292***  0.1905 
721 - 1,080 days to default      -0.8978***  0.1857  -0.9538***  0.1853 
1,081 - 1,440 days to default      -1.6015***  0.2964  -1.6478***  0.2974 
> 1,440 days to default      -1.2264***  0.1939  -1.2947***  0.1901 
Chapter 11          0.2574**  0.1102 
US          -0.2331*  0.1302 
Size          -0.0713**  0.0305 
Telecommunications          -0.0247  0.1003 
Fallen angel          -0.1032  0.1339 
Observations  877    877    877   
Adjusted R




   Regression I  Regression II  Regression III 
  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Panel II: S&P rating change as depend-
ent variable   
Intercept  0.9507***  0.0575  2.2019***  0.1211  2.2356***  0.1891 
? Rating by S&P 1-90 days before  -0.0112  0.0678  -0.1963***  0.0656  -0.1912***  0.0671 
? Rating by S&P 91-180 days before  -0.0126  0.0842  -0.1731**  0.0751  -0.1846**  0.0754 
? Rating by S&P 181-360 days before  0.1072  0.0751  0.0178  0.0624  -0.0122  0.0642 
? Rating by Moody’s 1-90 days before  0.4451***  0.0581  0.2759***  0.0558  0.2870***  0.0557 
? Rating by Moody’s 91-180 days before  0.3079***  0.0620  0.1626***  0.0602  0.1782***  0.0600 
? Rating by Moody’s 181-360 days 
before  0.0974  0.0829  0.0781  0.0707  0.0744  0.0707 
91 - 180 days to default      -0.6290***  0.1346  -0.6405***  0.1358 
181 - 360 days to default      -1.0732***  0.1360  -1.0848***  0.1370 
361 - 540 days to default      -1.2246***  0.1547  -1.2447***  0.1554 
541 - 720 days to default      -1.4182***  0.1597  -1.4286***  0.1593 
721 - 1080 days to default      -1.5621***  0.1580  -1.5536***  0.1564 
1081 - 1440 days to default      -2.1508***  0.2229  -2.1423***  0.2230 
> 1440 days to default      -2.2005***  0.1923  -2.2105***  0.1913 
Chapter 11          0.0147  0.0994 
US          -0.3275***  0.1236 
Size          0.0117  0.0276 
Telecommunications          -0.0883  0.1003 
Fallen angel          -0.1624  0.1264 
Observations  1,178    1,178    1,178   
Adjusted R
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